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Deliberative Democracy and the American
Civil Jury
Valerie P. Hans, John Gastil, and Traci Feller*
Civil jury service should be a potent form of deliberative democracy, creating greater civic
engagement. However, a 2010 seven-state study of jury service and voting records found no
overall boost in civic engagement following service on civil juries, whereas jurors who served
on criminal cases did show increased civic engagement following their jury service. This
article reports a project that augments the civil jury data set with information about jury
decision rule, jury size, defendant identity, and case type and examines whether specific
types of civil jury service influence postservice voting. Taking into account preservice voting
records, jurors who serve on a civil jury that is required to reach unanimity or a civil jury of
12 are significantly more likely to vote after their service. Jurors who decide cases with
organizational, as opposed to individual, defendants likewise show a boost in voting behav-
ior, as do jurors deciding contract or nonautomotive torts cases compared to automotive
torts. Limitations and implications of these findings for deliberative democracy theory and
jury practice are discussed.
I. Introduction
Recent research has celebrated the civic impact of criminal jury service (Gastil et al. 2008),
but the same investigation found no comparable impact from civil trials. Though this could
reflect a fundamental difference between the civic experience of civil and criminal service,
there are strong reasons to believe the value of jury service transcends the nature of the
criminal versus civil distinction.
In particular, the theory and practice of deliberative democracy suggests that con-
siderable civic benefits should accrue from consequential experience of reasoned discus-
sions among citizens about public concerns (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Eveland et al.
2011; Jacobs et al. 2009). Such activity, which provides a stark counterpoint to more
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conventional—and often less reflective and egalitarian—political practices (Dryzek 2012;
Fishkin 1991; Gastil 2008), can transform citizens’ attitudes, habits, and skills in a way that
sparks greater participation in other domains of political life (Pincock 2012). If jury service
is “akin to voting” (Amar 1995), that should be at least as true for the civil jury as for the
criminal, since civil trials often have a starkly political dimension, such as when they
concern an alleged civil rights violation or weigh punitive damages against a corporation
that polluted public lands (Ferguson 2012; Hans 2000). Thus, some kinds of civil jury
experience should inspire citizens to take greater advantage of their other civic opportu-
nities, such as the chance to vote in future elections.
To explore that possibility, we undertook a secondary analysis of previously collected
data on criminal and civil juries—the same data set that uncovered no overall civic jury
service voting effect (Gastil et al. 2008). We brought to this reanalysis new codes based on
case characteristics, the inclusion of previously unexamined trial features of decision rule
and jury size, and a multilevel analysis that took into account individual, jury, and structural
differences among juries within and between different jurisdictions. In doing so, we showed
that beneath the absence of an aggregate civil jury effect lie conflicting findings that
revealed when—and why—the civil trial does or does not cause a civic awakening among its
jurors.
II. Jury Service and Civic Engagement
A. Jury Service and Civic Engagement
Jury service should be a particularly potent form of deliberative democracy because it
engages citizens in deliberation with one another to resolve important social and political
disputes. As long ago as 1835, the French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville had a
similar insight. He wrote what has become a famous passage about the American jury’s role
in educating citizens about self-government and the rule of law:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the
minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation
for free institutions. . . . It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the
duties which they are bound to discharge toward society; and the part which they take in the
Government. (Tocqueville [1835] 1961:336–37)
Tocqueville asserted that jury service enhanced jurors’ qualities as citizens. They were
better informed about the rule of law, and they were more closely connected to the state.
Thus, quite independently of what the jury contributed to dispute resolution, participation
on the jury had salutary effects on the jurors themselves. Following Tocqueville, contem-
porary scholars have praised the civic engagement potential of the jury (Amar 1995;
Diamond 1993; Dzur 2012; Fukurai & Krooth 2010; Vidmar & Hans 2007). In the U.S.
Supreme Court jury selection decision Powers v. Ohio (1991), the justices approvingly
quoted Tocqueville. The opinion went on to emphasize the nature of jury service as
political participation:
698 Hans et al.
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and
insures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people. . . . It “affords ordinary citizens a
valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government, an experience fostering, one
hopes, a respect for law. . . .” Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and
privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
(Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407, 1991, internal citations omitted)
Until recently, these claims about the civic impact of jury service were largely
untested. The first modern study was Paula Consolini’s (1992) doctoral research, which
revealed that some jurors experienced boosts in political self-confidence along with con-
siderable increases in knowledge about the judicial branch. Posttrial surveys of jurors also
suggest that jury service influences attitudes toward the courts: the vast majority of jurors
are very satisfied with their jury duty and come to hold more positive views about the courts
(Diamond 1993; Gastil et al. 2010). These educational and attitudinal effects suggest that
jury service has the potential to promote civic engagement.
John Gastil and his collaborators undertook a systematic test of the civic engagement
effects of jury service in a substantial study examining jury service and voting rates (Gastil
et al. 2002, 2008, 2010). An initial study in Thurston County, Washington, used pre- and
postjury service voting records of approximately 800 residents who had served as jurors in
criminal trials. Not surprisingly, a juror’s voting record before jury duty was a strong
predictor of the juror’s voting record after jury duty; however, what happened during jury
service also made a difference. Those who deliberated and reached a verdict—that is, had
a conclusive experience—voted more frequently after their service, compared to those
empanelled jurors whose trials were dismissed, who served as alternates, or were on hung
juries that could not reach a verdict (Gastil et al. 2002). Consistent with prior research on
deliberation’s potential for civic impact (Jacobs et al. 2009; Pincock 2012), the study found
that a conclusive experience of deliberation provided a civic spark that manifested as an
increase in voting rates even years after completing one’s service.
That same research team expanded its scope with a national study that collected jury
service and voting records from additional counties across the United States (Gastil et al.
2008, 2010). They discovered that the experience of serving on a criminal jury increased
voting, but only for certain groups of jurors. To avoid floor and ceiling effects, Gastil and
his collaborators removed those jurors whose voting history showed that they never or
always voted. In the analysis, they divided jurors into two groups (those who had voted
infrequently vs. those who had voted regularly before their jury service) and then took into
account whether those jurors deliberated or not. The results showed that jurors who had
voted infrequently prior to their service were significantly more likely to vote after their
service if they deliberated compared to jurors who did not deliberate (because they were
alternates or because their trial was cut short by plea, mistrial, or some other reason). No
effect was found for jurors who had voted on a regular basis in the past.1
1It bears noting that though such research established a causal link from jury service to voting, it could not reconstruct
the baseline rates at which deliberating and nondeliberating jurors would have voted had they not appeared for jury
service. Exogenous factors, including the act of voting itself (Gerber et al. 2003) influence voting turnout for jurors
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Explaining the effect for deliberating jurors, the authors suggested that jury
service may have civic engagement potential when jurors have conclusive, efficacious
experiences. The researchers calculated that jurors who deliberated and reached verdicts
increased their voting by 4 percent or more in subsequent elections, an increase compa-
rable in size to a year in student government or enrollment in a civics class (Gastil et al.
2010:46).
However, in a key finding important to this article, the voting boost was not observed
in civil cases (Gastil et al. 2010:45). Postservice voting rates for civil jurors who deliberated
were comparable to empanelled civil jurors who did not have the chance to do so. Even
when broken down by prior voting history, conclusive civil jury experiences did not produce
an overall boost in voting. There is some irony in these civil juror results, since Tocqueville
([1835] 1961) singled out the civil jury for its deliberative potential. What is more, civil
juries often have the opportunity to make crucial judgments that are political rather than
criminal in nature, such as deciding whether a corporation has behaved negligently (Hans
2000) or determining damages in discrimination cases (Hans 2014).
B. Explaining Differences Between Criminal and Civil Jury Experiences
Our inquiry begins by reflecting on the reasons why criminal and civil jury service might
engender different civic outcomes. Criminal trials may be more significant than civil trials
to jurors who decide them because of their salience, accessibility, and intrinsically interest-
ing subject matter. Criminal trials are regular fodder for the news media as well as popular
television series and entertainment shows (Papke 2007). Because the criminal trial is
familiar to them, jurors may feel more competent to decide the outcome of criminal cases.
When people think about juries, they tend to recall the criminal jury because it is an
important symbol of democracy and because criminal trials are far more common than civil
trials (Vidmar & Hans 2007). Indeed, civil jurors sometimes employ criminal law language,
calling a civil defendant “guilty” rather than liable for negligently causing injuries (Hans
2013:411). When citizens receive a jury summons, they likely expect to decide a criminal
case in a group of 12 people who must decide unanimously. For such jurors, a civil trial
would be a violation of their assumptions, and could be somewhat of a disappointment,
resulting in a dampened civic impact.
What is more, the jury’s political role as the judge of government action may be more
salient in a criminal trial. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
right to a jury trial in state criminal cases was fundamental to the U.S. system of justice,
noting the criminal jury’s key role in protecting individuals against arbitrary state power:
“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge. . . . Fear of unchecked power . . . found expression in the
criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt
or innocence” (1968:157). This political dimension may highlight for jurors that they are
and nonjurors alike, so all that can be said definitively is that jury deliberation heightens future voter turnout relative
to the experience of nondeliberation.
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part of the state apparatus of justice. Despite the fact that many citizens try to avoid
jury duty, members of the public regard the criminal jury as a legitimate government
institution (Hans 1993). A healthy 65 percent of Americans trust a jury more than a judge
to determine the guilt or innocence of someone accused of criminal behavior (Rasmussen
Reports 2012).
In contrast, the right to a civil jury has not been held to be such a fundamental
right (Marder 2005:44; Schaffner 2001–2002). The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that
the right to a civil jury trial (guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment) is binding on the
states (through the Fourteenth Amendment), even though it has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a criminal jury as a requirement all states must uphold. Although
many jury scholars extol the political dimensions of the civil jury (e.g., Carrington 2003),
some scholars dispute the importance of the civil jury’s political role, pointing to the fact
that civil juries mostly resolve disputes between individual parties instead of defendants
charged by the state with wrongdoing (Priest 1990; Solomon 2012). A very substantial
amount of the civil jurors’ time is spent in deciding auto accident cases and assessing
routine damages (Priest 1990:179). Solomon argued that deciding civil damages is a “poor
way for members of a community to articulate their values and participate in government”
(2012:1382).
Civil juror decisions are given less deference by the courts than criminal jury deci-
sions. Trial judges have the ability to set aside decisions for either plaintiff or defendant,
and they regularly adjust the damage awards decided by juries (Vidmar & Hans 2007). In
contrast to the high regard given criminal juries, civil juries have been subject to sustained
attacks and advertising campaigns by corporate, business, and insurance interests who
question their competence to decide contemporary civil disputes (Daniels 1989;
Robbennolt 2002; Sunstein et al. 1998; Vidmar & Hans 2007). Also, public opinion about
the civil jury seems to be more negative (Gastil et al. 2010), perhaps influenced by these ad
campaigns and other efforts (Hans 1993). In sum, the greater salience of the political
quality of criminal adjudication, along with the apparently higher regard for the criminal
jury among the public, may enhance the civic engagement potential of the criminal jury
compared to the civil jury.
The nature of the civil jury’s deliberative task may constitute the greatest difference
between criminal and civil juries. Whereas the prototypical criminal jury has a binary
decision that requires a judgment about guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” on one or more
charges, the civil jury must simply consider the “preponderance of evidence” and seek a
sufficiently large majority to render a decision. Moreover, civil juries often end up negoti-
ating between different points of view (Hans 2000), with possible verdicts ranging from, say,
“no liability” to liability with a small damage award, to liability with a large award. The
almost continuous scale of possible judgments permits the jury to bargain its way to a
majority, rather than wrestling between guilt and innocence in search of unanimity. Nego-
tiations typically differ from deliberations in their character (Mansbridge 2009), and this
may substantially alter the civic experience of civil jury service. At a minimum, the fact that
verdicts often require only a majority means that some jurors end up as de facto dissenters,
which likely diminishes their satisfaction with the verdict—a variable that partially accounts
for the jury’s civic benefit (Gastil et al. 2010).
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C. Important Structural Differences Among Civil Trials
The preceding discussion generalizes across civil juries, but the structural conditions of civil
jury trials vary considerably across jurisdictions and trials, and those variations may hold the
key to explaining differential civic engagement effects across civil juries. The fact that civil
juries differ structurally across and within different states was not considered in the prior
research by Gastil et al. (2008, 2010), so adding it to the analysis may reveal previously
unseen civil jury effects.
In all but a handful of states, serious criminal cases are decided by juries composed
of 12 citizens who must agree unanimously in the verdict. In contrast, states vary consider-
ably in the size and decision rule required for civil juries (Bureau of Justice Statistics
2004:233–37, Table 42). For cost, efficiency, and other reasons, many states have reduced
the size of civil juries and have replaced a rule that jurors decide unanimously with a
majority decision rule. These structural differences raise questions about whether civil and
criminal juries function as decision-making bodies in the same way. Research suggests that
both the representativeness of the jury and the experience of the decision-making process
are likely to differ as a function of size and decision rule.
The research on jury decision rules show that they have profound effects on the
functioning of the jury (Devine 2012:44–46; Diamond et al. 2006; Hans 2001; Hastie et al.
1983). Juries deliberating under unanimity tend to discuss the case longer and to have more
thorough and robust deliberations. In a realistic jury simulation study that varied the
decision rule of the mock juries, unanimous decision rule juries brought up more facts,
discussed important facts more thoroughly, corrected errors more frequently, and encour-
aged participation by jurors who held minority views (Hastie et al. 1983). Overall, jurors
who participate under a unanimous decision rule express more satisfaction than do those
who decide under majority decision rules, even though unanimous decision rule juries are
more likely to hang (Hans et al. 2003). Juries seeking unanimity may also have more active
participation by all jurors, and one’s involvement in the deliberation can contribute to the
eventual civic impact of such participation (Gastil et al. 2010; Pincock 2012).
A substantial body of research has examined the effects of jury size on the repre-
sentativeness and functioning of the jury (for summaries, see Devine 2012; Saks & Marti
1997). Studies confirm that the representativeness of larger 12-person juries is superior;
larger juries are better able to represent the wide range of viewpoints and perspectives in
the community. In addition, larger juries deliberate longer and under some circumstances
engage in higher quality deliberations (Devine 2012:41–44). On the other hand, partici-
pation among the jurors is more variable in larger than smaller juries. Exposure to a larger
range of viewpoints and debating with diverse others might enhance the civic engagement
effect in larger juries. Alternatively, if jurors do not participate much, and are lost in the
crowd in a larger jury, the civic engagement potential of larger juries may be decreased.
In addition to these important structural differences, the parties differ between
criminal and civil juries. Most juries in criminal cases convict, and a conviction aligns jurors
with the state. In a criminal case, jurors hold the fate of an individual defendant, or at most
a small number of defendants, in their hands. In many cases, their judgments have a
profound impact on the lives of the defendants. The consequences of their decision for an
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individual defendant may be obvious, compared to the consequences of their decision for
business or corporate defendants in civil cases. Corporate law theorists have posited that it
is easier to feel empathy for individuals than for a faceless corporation, and that empathy
difference leads jurors to treat corporate defendants differently than individual defendants
(Hans 2000). Although individual defendants may be easier to empathize with, when a
juror judges the legal responsibility of large businesses and corporations, the political
dimensions of the task become apparent.
D. Hypotheses
Drawing on insights from research on deliberative democracy and jury decision making, we
hypothesize that different civil jury experiences—deciding under a majority versus a unani-
mous decision rule, deliberating in smaller versus larger juries, and determining the fate of
individual parties versus organizational parties such as businesses and corporations—are
likely to lead to different civic engagement effects. To be clear, all these predicted effects
refer only to those individuals placed on civil juries—as opposed to everyone who answers the
summons and arrives at a courthouse. In the present article, we take advantage of variation
in civil jury structure and party type to examine whether civil jurors in diversely structured
juries differ in terms of subsequent civic engagement. Comparing preservice and
postservice voting records of civil jurors, we hypothesize the following.
First, we predict both a main effect for unanimity and an interaction effect with
whether the juror had the chance to deliberate. Civil jurors deciding cases under a unani-
mous decision rule are likely to show a larger boost in civic engagement than civil juries
deliberating under majority rules because unanimity forces more deliberation and more
thorough deliberation. The effect should be strongest for those civil jurors who actually
deliberate; however, we predict a main effect because even for nondeliberating jurors, the
anticipation of interaction could prove important (Augustinova et al. 2005; Sommers 2006).
In a similar way, we predict both a main effect for jury size and an interaction effect
with deliberative opportunity. To be sure, smaller groups are more intimate and may
provide a more satisfying experience (Hare 1981), and larger bodies leave a reduced share
of power for each member (Dahl & Tufte 1973). Even so, we anticipate that participation
in larger juries will boost the civic engagement effect more than participation in smaller
juries. The larger and more representative jury offers a more inclusive and dynamic public
space, which is why those who design deliberative public events routinely rely on larger
bodies of citizens, such as the 24-person citizens’ jury process (Crosby & Nethercutt 2005).
The 12-person jury, in particular, conforms to the aforementioned popular conception of
the jury’s appropriate size. The size effect should be greater for deliberating jurors, leading
to a significant interaction with deliberation, but because there is exposure to diverse others
during the trial, we also predict a positive main effect of jury size on civic engagement.
As for individual versus corporate defendants, the literature can justify predictions
both ways. The likely greater empathy for individuals suggests that a case with only human
parties may be more engaging and satisfying for jurors. After all, one of Gastil et al.’s
(2010:200) findings was that compared to civil case jurors, criminal case jurors found their
experience to be more engaging and more likely to have exceeded expectations. In
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contrast, the presence of a business or a corporation in the case alerts jurors to the political
nature of their role as community representatives. When a civil jury decides the fate of a
business or corporation, the political nature of jury decision making is more prominent
(Priest 1990; Solomon 2012). Though we are equivocal on the direction of its civic effect,
we include this variable owing to its potential to shape jurors’ experiences.
Finally, when a civil juror actually deliberates with others, civic engagement effects
should be strongest. Gastil et al. (2008, 2010) used deliberation as a contrast, comparing
jurors who experienced deliberation to those who did not. In this analysis of civil jurors, we
predict that, after controlling for the other factors introduced in our study, deliberation will
enhance jurors’ civic engagement. As we noted above, however, it is likely that deliberation
interacts with the structural variables of jury size and decision rule. These potential inter-
actions were hidden in the previous Gastil et al. (2002, 2008, 2010) analyses of criminal
juries because of the largely invariant 12-person unanimous nature of criminal jury decision
making.
III. Research Methods
A. Data Collection and Study Participants
This study employs data originally collected by Gastil et al. (2008, 2010). The original data
set included both criminal and civil jurors, and we analyze only civil jurors. In addition, we
coded additional case and jury characteristics that were not part of the original data set and
were not previously analyzed. In particular, we categorized each case in terms of jury size,
decision rule, whether the parties were exclusively individuals or included organizational
parties such as businesses and corporations, and the case type (auto, nonauto tort, or
contract).
The data set is best viewed as a demographically and politically diverse convenience
sample of jurors serving in counties that varied in their legal systems and jury procedures.
For the periods studied, it constitutes a complete census of juries in the selected counties,
but the counties themselves and the sampling period are not random. Gastil et al. (2008)
found it impossible for both technical and logistical reasons to collect jury service and
voting data for a fully representative national random sample of jurors. Only some counties
made available complete jury records that could be coupled with adequate voting histories.
Moreover, Gastil et al. (2008) estimated that the collection of even their limited data
required over 1,000 hours of work by researchers and court staff.
The portion of that data set we extracted included 522 different civil juries (each with
a unique docket number) and 3,378 individual jurors. This included 195 jurors from
Boulder County (Colorado), 252 from Cumberland and Swain Counties (North Carolina),
834 from Douglas County (Nebraska), 428 from El Paso County (Texas), 153 from Orleans
Parish (Louisiana), 781 from Summit County (Ohio), and 735 from Thurston and King
Counties (Washington).
The research team collected the original jury service and voting records by visiting
each county for one week to enter juror names and trial characteristics into a database,
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which was then merged with the official voter database using name-matching software
(Gastil et al. 2008). Excluding criminal trials, this yielded a data set with 3,378 empanelled
civil jurors with matching voter histories. Of the civil jurors in this data set, 2,875 served on
juries that deliberated, 377 were dismissed for various other reasons (out-of-court settle-
ment, case dismissed, mistrial, etc.), and 126 served only as alternates, never joining in jury
deliberation. A data set this large was necessary both because of how we intended to
subdivide the data and because the effect size being pursued was likely to be relatively small,
with the jury-voting association yielding effect sizes of b < 0.10 in Gastil et al. (2002, 2008).
State courts differed in the information they collected about jurors, so we were
unable to use individual characteristics without considerable data loss. That said, in the
jurisdictions where these data were collected, 55 percent of the jurors were female, two-
thirds were 41–65 years old (with 12.5 percent older than 65), and 52 percent were
identified as non-Hispanic white (with 24 percent Hispanic and 20 percent black). Forty-
five percent of the sample were registered Democrats, 29 percent were Republican, and 26
percent identified themselves as independent or with a third party.
B. Measures
1. Voting Rates
The dependent variable in our analyses is the change in voting rates for individual jurors
before and after their period of service. Ninety percent of the jury trials selected for study
began after March 18, 1996, and ended by June 14, 2004, with roughly two-thirds of trials
(64.1 percent) commencing in 1997–2000. Voting rate was calculated based on all regular
county-wide primaries, presidential primaries, and general elections; the number of times
voting was divided by the number of opportunities to vote. Histories generally spanned
from the 1994 primary to the 2004 general, with histories reaching back even further in
North Carolina (1992) and Nebraska (1987). For our sample, the average turnout rate
before jury service was 50.1 percent, and postservice turnout was 56.4 percent.
For the main analyses, the change in voting rate, rather than the postservice voting
rate itself, was the chosen dependent measure. This departs from the approach taken in the
Gastil et al. (2008, 2010) analyses, which used postservice voting rate as the dependent
variable and preservice voting rate as the control. We opt to use the difference in voting rate
because it yields a more normally distributed dependent variable.2
Preservice voting rate was used as a control in all regression models, for one’s
previous voting rate is a very strong predictor of future voting behavior (Gerber et al. 2003).
In the full sample of civil jurors, pre- and postservice voting rates were significantly corre-
lated (r = 0.631, p < 0.0001). As in the earlier analyses of these data (Gastil et al. 2008,
2010), jurors with no history of voting or a history of voting in every single election were
removed to create a more normal distribution of both pre- and postservice voting rates and
to reduce floor and ceiling effects. Jurors with no recorded votes in preservice elections can
only increase their voting rate, and those with perfect records can only reduce it. Their
2A comparison of the two methods with these data yielded no marked differences in the results.
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exclusion yields a dependent variable—change in voting rate—that can go up or down for
every juror-voter in the data set.
2. Deliberated
We employed a simplification of the juror role distinctions made in Gastil et al. (2008,
2010) by differentiating those jurors who deliberated from all others. Hung juries were rare
in the civil data set (only 23 jurors had that experience), and sample sizes for the various
nondeliberating categories (alternate, mistrial for reasons other than failure to reach a
verdict, case dismissed by judge, withdrawn claim, or out-of-court settlement) totaled only
16 percent of the sample (N = 301). Whereas the deliberation dichotomy constituted the
principal focus in Gastil et al. (2008), in our study it counts as only one among many
measures of the jury experience. This also allows us to explore the possibility that even
nondeliberating jurors’ experience might influence their postservice voting rates.
3. Jury Decision Rule
Table 1 shows the civil jury procedures for reaching verdicts across the states studied.
Within each state, for decision rule, there was a clear default rule followed by a strong
majority of its juries, and each state’s juries were coded accordingly. The one case meriting
a coding judgment was Nebraska, which requires juries to reach unanimous verdicts unless
their deliberation exceeds six hours, at which point a five-sixths majority rule goes into
effect. Because Nebraska, in effect, has a majority decision rule, we coded it as such.3 Such
a procedure resembles the deliberative democratic model of a unitary spirit of discussion
within a de facto majority rule situation (Cohen 1989), in that a five-sixth majority needs
only time and patience to exercise its will over the one or two dissenting jurors. For the full
sample, 13.2 percent of jurors used a unanimity decision rule, with the rest using variations
on majority rule (from three-fourths to five-sixths).
4. Jury Size
Jurors also served on bodies of varied size, as detailed in Table 1. The challenge here was
that states permit some variation in jury size, depending on the nature of the case, the level
of court, and stipulations by the parties. Given the data-collection methods used by Gastil
et al. (2008), it was not possible to account for stray jurors who might have left during trials,
and some individual jurors may have been left out of the data set (i.e., if their name was
illegible on court records). Nonetheless, using the number of jurors in the data set associ-
ated with each unique docket number (and spot-checked against the court records
collected), we were able to make a distinction between full 12-person juries (49.1 percent
of the sample) versus juries of various smaller sizes.
3A future study with a larger sample could distinguish fruitfully among a spectrum of decision rules, ranging from
simple majority, up through ever-more-demanding supermajorities, to consensus. Given the nature of our sample, a
binary split seemed more appropriate, and since Nebraska does not require unanimity, we coded it as majoritarian.
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5. Organizational Defendant
Each case’s records were coded to ascertain which involved organizations (e.g., businesses,
agencies, nongovernmental organizations) as defendants. Given that this study constituted
a secondary analysis of previously collected data, the court records originally collected by
Gastil et al. (2008) were not always adequate to this coding task. Nonetheless, a majority of
jurors (52.7 percent) served on cases that could be classified in these terms, with 55.6
percent sitting in the jury box during cases with exclusively individual defendants and 44.4
percent serving on cases that included one or more organizational defendants. The modal
issue for individual defendants was an automotive incident, which accounted for 71.5
percent of such trials. When the defendant was an organization, these cases were mostly
nonautomotive torts (40.1 percent) or contract disputes (37.2 percent).
Given the large amount of missing information for the variable, we checked to see if
the distribution of unclassifiable cases was starkly different in terms of the type of claim.
Overall, jurors predominantly served in automotive cases (38.2 percent), nonautomotive
tort cases (36.4 percent), or contract cases (19.5 percent), with only 4.6 percent of cases
falling into other categories or being unclassifiable. These data are very similar to the
national data on state civil jury trials summarized by Cohen (2008:600, Table 1), with torts
constituting 80.7 percent and contracts constituting 17.9 percent of all civil jury trials.
Among those cases where the defendant’s individual/organizational identity could not be
established definitively, the figures were roughly comparable (27.9 percent, 46.4 percent,
18.4 percent, and 7.2 percent), with a larger portion of nonautomotive torts.
6. Claim Type
We also explored the efficacy of using civil claim type as an alternative variable to
organizational defendant. Though claim type has less theoretical heft than does
organizational defendant, some have argued that certain types of claims (e.g., automotive
“fender benders”) have no significant political or public content and may not even warrant
a jury’s deliberation (Priest 1990; Solomon 2012). Moreover, this variable had a very low
rate of data loss (only 1.2 percent of jurors served on unclassifiable cases in this regard).
Thus, in our results we include an alternative model that substitutes claim type for
organizational defendant. Models including both variables (not shown) yielded no signifi-
cant result for either one, probably because of their strong overlap.
7. Geographic Location
To take into account any further unmeasured variance in jury rules and experiences that
varied between states, each juror was coded based on the state where he or she served. It is
reasonable to expect that states will vary substantially in pre- to postservice voting rates,
quite independent of the experience of jury service. We also explored breaking the data
down by county, but there was only one state that had sufficiently large samples from two
different counties (King and Thurston Counties, Washington).
Our theoretical interest is in the structural variables of jury size and jury decision rule.
However, these two features of civil juries varied by the state (see Table 1). Decision
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rule and jury size were not randomly associated across juries and across states; indeed, the
state and jury structural variables overlapped substantially. In the ideal world, with jury
service and voting records from all 50 states, we might be able to examine the separate
effects of states and jury trial procedures simultaneously. However, in the real world, we
were limited to the seven states in the existing data set. Thus we faced a major challenge in
disentangling the general effects due to the state and the effects due to these two theoretical
variables of jury size and decision rule.
We explored alternative models that directly incorporated the state as a fixed vari-
able. However, the alternative models that included state fixed effects did not permit us to
estimate the effects for one or more of the jury structure variables. In the end, we decided
to include the two theoretical variables of interest and exclude the state variable in our
main regression analyses. In other analyses, we did employ the state as a fixed factor along
with organizational defendant and claims type variables (excluding size and decision
rule), and we describe those results below.
IV. Results
A series of regression equations were estimated to build, step by step, a complete multilevel
model of change in voting rate that took into account individual-level, jury-level, and
state-level effects and interactions. All predictors except case type were entered as con-
tinuous variables to aid in the interpretation of mean differences; results were the same
when those variables were entered as fixed effects. All models controlled for the fact that
jurors who sat on the same jury were not independent by including the state docket number
as a control variable. Multicollinearity tests were also run and showed no violations of
assumptions; the largest correlation among predictors was a modest r = −0.18 (between jury
size and organizational defendant).
A. Hypothesis Tests
The first notable effect appears in the first model in Table 2, which shows the effect of
individuals’ prejury service voting rate on the change in their voting rates. The negative
association reflects the fact that when one starts with a high voting frequency, any change
that occurs is more likely than not to be small, or even negative in some cases. Likewise,
those relatively infrequent voters are more likely to experience a larger and more consist-
ently positive change over time, owing to the same tendency of regression toward the mean.
The effect is not large, but it is significant and stable through each model.
Other individual-difference control variables, such as sex, ethnicity, age, and political
party, were included in alternative models but yielded no substantial differences. What is
more, they created nonrandom missing data problems between the states, which provided
such information unevenly, so they are not included in any of the reported models.
Model 2 of Table 2 introduces the main predictors and tests many of our hypotheses.
As was found in previous research using these same data (Gastil et al. 2008, 2010), delibera-
tion had no direct overall effect on postservice voting rates among civil jurors. The nature of
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the defendant did make a difference: when jurors served on cases with organizational
defendants, they had an experience that resulted in a more positive change in their voting
rates (b = 0.038) than did those jurors whose cases featured only individual defendants. As
predicted, the unanimous decision rule also tended to yield more positive change in juror
voting rates (b = 0.052). The size of the jury had no significant direct overall effect.
Model 3 of Table 2 introduces the hypothesized interactions, whereby the influence of
deliberation depends on the decision rule and size of a jury. The decision rule × deliberation
interaction was significant (b = −0.212), and the jury size × deliberation interaction was
nearly so (b = −0.172, p = 0.062). (An additional two-way interaction for organizational
defendant was included in alternative models but never reached significance.)
The nature of both interactions was clear, as revealed by the estimated means in
Table 3. The top half of that table shows that the effect of unanimity (vs. majority rule) on
Table 2: Estimates of Fixed Effects on Change in Individual Voting Rates After Civil
Jury Service
Level of Analysis/Independent
Variable
Model 1:
Juror Only
Model 2:
Juror + Jury
Model 3:
Jury Interactions
Model 4:
Claim Types
Intercept 0.168** 0.146** −0.053 0.146**
(0.015) (0.031) (0.091) (0.032)
Level 1 (Individual)
Voting rate before jury service −0.264** −0.278** −0.281** −0.277**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.091) (0.029)
Level 2 (Jury)
Served on jury that deliberated (no = 0, yes = 1) 0.000 0.207* 0.000
(0.022) (0.092) (0.022)
One or more defendants was an organization
(no = 0, yes = 1)
0.038** 0.036** —
(0.013) (0.013)
Unanimous jury decision rule (0 = majoritarian,
1 = unanimous)
0.052** 0.220* 0.049**
(0.015) (0.091) (0.015)
Jury had 12 members (0 = 6–8, 1 = 12) −0.001 0.200* −0.007
(0.017) (0.091) (0.017)
Deliberated × Unanimity (interaction term) −0.212* —
(0.092)
Deliberated × 12-person (interaction term) −0.172+ —
(0.092)
Case Type
Contract (1) vs. Automotive (0) 0.036+
(0.019)
Other tort (1) vs. Automotive (0) 0.035*
(0.014)
Covariance Parameters
Residual 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Docket number × State variance 0.041 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
−2 log likelihood −338.7 −335.0 −334.0 −328.1
Note: Minimum N = 1,038 with list-wise deletion for all variables employed in these models. In each model, the
random intercept was the interaction of state by jury docket number. Two-tailed statistical significance levels are
indicated by +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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change in voting rate was significant for both deliberating and nondeliberating jurors. In
both cases, the difference was significant, but the interaction term reflects a net negative
decline in voting rate for one of the four conditions—those jurors who were assigned
majority rule and who did not deliberate. In other words, jurors who were seated for a majority
rule trial and only anticipated deliberation (or began but did not complete it) experienced
an average decline in their voting rates (M = −0.061), whereas the voting rate increased in
all other conditions. Also of note, that increase in voting rate was highest for unanimity rule
juries that did not deliberate (M = 0.149). Recalling that the unanimity decision rule was
given to fewer than one in six jurors, it is not surprising that, in the aggregate, the positive
effects of unanimity-based civil jury service were not readily apparent in previous analyses of
these data (e.g., Gastil et al. 2010).
The bottom half of Table 3 shows a strikingly similar pattern for jury size. On average,
jurors in three of the four conditions experienced a net increase in their voter turnout
rates. Recalling that the sample as a whole experienced an increase in turnout of roughly
0.06 (i.e., 6 percent), the only cell that clearly exceeds that rate was the 12-person
nondeliberating jury (M = 0.139). Smaller juries that did not deliberate experienced an
average drop in turnout rate of −0.061, which yields the only significant difference in means
for that table (p = 0.029). Once again, it is the nondeliberating juries that appear most
responsive to the structural conditions of their service.4
4To satisfy the curiosity of those who wondered about the fate of jurors with no prior voting history, the same models
shown in Table 2 were estimated for those individuals and yielded none of the associations shown therein. The only
significant finding was a negative main effect for jury size (b = −0.125 [SE = 0.04], p < 0.003) in Model 2. As in Gastil
et al. (2010), we do not wish to overinterpret such nonfindings or the anomalous result, given our uncertainty about
voter histories that include long pre- or postservice periods of zero turnout, which could reflect voters’ erratic
registration or changes in residency as much as their actual voting frequency.
Table 3: Pair-Wise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means (and Standard Deviations)
for Key Comparisons in Multilevel Analyses of Change in Individual Voting Rates After Civil
Jury Service
No Deliberation Deliberation
Pair-Wise Significance of
Column Comparisons (p)
Majority rule −0.071 0.032 0.035
(0.048) (0.010)
Unanimity 0.149 0.080 0.308
(0.067) (0.012)
Pair-Wise Significance of
Row Comparisons (p)
0.016 0.002
Fewer than 12 person −0.061 0.061 0.074
(0.067) (0.013)
12 person 0.139 0.051 0.068
(0.048) (0.012)
Pair-Wise Significance of
Row Comparisons (p)
0.029 0.528
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B. Analyses of Claim Types
Model 4 presents an alternative approach to thinking about different kinds of claims and
defendants. In place of the organizational defendant, it substitutes a three-category variable
that distinguishes between contract claims, automotive claims, and all other torts. The
organizational defendant variable and the claim type variable overlapped consider-
ably so they could not be included in the same analysis.
Using automotive cases as the comparison group, the analysis reveals two significant
effects for claim type. Estimated means provide a clearer picture of these differences. Those
who served on contract cases had an average voting rate change of 0.057 (SD = 0.016),
which was comparable to that resulting for jurors on nonautomotive tort cases (M = 0.056,
SD = 0.011). Those jurors hearing automotive claims, however, had a mean change in
voting rate of 0.021 (SD = 0.009). Thus, the civic impact of jury service diminished for those
serving on automotive cases. Otherwise, the main results in Model 4 are consistent with
those in Model 2, which was the equivalent model except for the swapping out of
organizational defendant for claim type.
The fact that organizational defendant cases and the types of claims varied consid-
erably across the states allowed us to explore another set of models that examined their
effects and state effects at the same time, but excluded the two state-level structural variables
of jury decision rule and jury size. One model included organizational defendant; the
other substituted claim type for organizational defendant. The juror’s preservice
voting rate and deliberation (whether the juror deliberated or not) were also included as
potential predictor variables. These two models including state effects produced very much
the same pattern of findings as Models 2 and 4 reported in Table 2. Preservice voting rate
remained a strong predictor; whether the juror deliberated had no direct effect; and
organizational defendant (in one model) and claim type (in the other) remained
statistically significant predictors of voting rate change.
V. Discussion
A. Summary of Findings
The preceding analyses yield four main findings. Most of all, civil juries can spark a civic
awakening for jurors, depending on the context of the trial. The civic effect is more visible
and positive when the defendants include at least one organization, as opposed to exclu-
sively private individuals, though it could also be said that the effect fades when the case
concerns an automotive claim. Civic effects are more potent for those civil juries that have
a unanimity decision rule. When the jurors are empanelled but do not have the chance to
deliberate, the civic effect can become negative if the jury would have used majority rule or
included fewer than 12 persons. The divergent effects of different jury sizes and decision
rules that we document here help to explain why Gastil et al.’s (2010) earlier analysis did
not detect an overall effect of civil jury service on voting.
The features of the jury that appear to promote civic engagement can be understood
as part of a single whole when seen through the eyes of a prospective juror. Those who show
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up for jury service for the first time have set their expectations based on what they know of
juries from other sources, particularly popular media (Papke 2007).
To get a glimpse of such representations, consider this attorney’s speech to an
empanelled jury on the television drama Leverage:5
A week ago you were all strangers. Then the same thing happened to all of you. You got that
envelope . . . Says County of Los Angeles on the top. A week passes. You watch the witnesses
parade through. You listen to the lawyers argue. Suddenly, you’re not strangers anymore . . . But
then the judge asks you to deliberate. . . . That envelope entrusted you with the most important
obligation of citizenship—to find the truth. It’s so important that we dare not give it to one
person, but to twelve strangers. Now all I ask is that you go into that room and you work together.
And you find the truth.
This brief speech touches on many of the findings reported here. The jurors move
from strangers to comrades through their shared experience even before the jury room delib-
eration begins. The trial itself engages them; as they hear evidence and weigh the case, they
experience a kind of “deliberation within” (Goodin & Niemeyer 2003). The task given to
them by the judge is not to vote until reaching a majority but “to find the truth,” an
aspiration more consistent with the unitary model of democracy than the majoritarian one
(Mansbridge 1983). The jury’s task is “so important that we dare not give it to one person,
but to twelve strangers,” which underscores the critical mass of 12 persons hearing the
evidence together. As for the nature of the defendant and claim, the lawsuit featured in this
television episode concerned a wrongful death allegedly caused by a dangerous product,
and it is hard to imagine such a speech coming during a low-stakes automotive negligence
case. Though this counts as but one vignette drawn from popular culture, it captures the
expectations that American culture sets for prospective jurors.
B. Limitations and Future Research
Examining the civic engagement impact of civil jury structural variables, organizational
versus individual defendants, and claim types, we faced challenges in employing a database
that included a modest number of states and incomplete coding of parties and individual
difference variables. Most importantly, our models could not simultaneously explore the
general impact of the state in which jurors served along with the size and decision rule the
jurors experienced. As the structural variables were of theoretical interest, we chose to
include them rather than particular states in our main regression analyses. That is an
obvious limitation that only an expanded database including jury service and voting records
in many more states would be able to address definitively. If there is limited variation within
states, even a 50-state database might not be adequate to the task.
Even taking this limitation into account, the findings confirmed many of our a priori
predictions about how characteristics of civil jury service might influence civic participa-
tion. What is more, supplementary analyses of the organizational defendant and claim type
5Season 1, Episode 11 (“The Juror No. 6 Job”) first aired Feb. 10, 2009. Summary available online at <www.imdb.com/
title/tt1300991>.
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variables that included the state as a predictor confirmed the effects of defendant and claim
type on civic engagement. Thus, we suggest that despite the evident limitations, as a first test
of the civic impact potential of different jury structures, the findings offer much of interest
to jury researchers and deliberative democracy scholars.
Future research could advance our understanding of the civil jury if it gathered an
even larger and more diverse sample of juries. An ideal study would have large enough
subsample sizes to permit more fine-grained distinctions among case types and among
different classifications of defendants. Ideally, one would construct a sample that included
within-state variations in jury structure (e.g., size and decision rule) within case type, but in
common practice, when those features vary, they do so in relation to particular cases (e.g.,
requiring unanimity for the highest-stakes trials). One could also construct a sample that
includes some states where judges stand for election (or retention) versus states where they
do not. The latter variable could reveal a difference in the civic experience of jury service
between those jurors whose judges are political actors versus those serving with judges less
restricted by such pressures.
A more challenging study would also include survey data from jurors, as Gastil et al.
(2010) did in the case of King County, Washington. Survey data could include information
about jurors’ prior experience of service, their preexisting attitudes toward civil juries
(potentially influenced by jurors’ political beliefs or party identification), and other poten-
tial moderators of the jury experience. That approach, however, would have to add tre-
mendous explanatory value to justify its considerable expense and difficulty, presuming
that one can even gain permission from the judges to collect such data—something only
some courts have proven willing to do.
C. Implications
When conceptualizing the jury as a significant deliberative body, our research suggests that
one must attend to the details of its features. When the jury becomes small, majoritarian,
and focused on more individual claims with little public heft, it may cease to function in the
way criminal juries and other deliberative bodies do. All civil juries have significant respon-
sibilities, but only some take on the complex and demanding tasks that both democratic
theorists and lay jurors expect from them. Empirical researchers have found the civic
benefits of deliberation to be contingent on context (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Pincock
2012), and the civil jury appears to be no exception to that rule.
More striking is the importance of structural features particularly in the case of
nondeliberating juries. Gastil et al. (2002, 2008, 2010) placed the focus squarely on the
deliberation room, which serves as the symbolic locale of the jury’s principal deliberative
task. The data here, however, underscore the significance of the pre-jury-room work that
jurors do together, which is conditioned by the structural circumstances that shape their
time together, even those conditions applying only when they go into the deliberation
room. Past research has shown that people’s anticipations of future interaction still have
considerable consequence (e.g., Augustinova et al. 2005).
The effect of jury size shows that jurors receive a greater civic boost from socializing
with a larger group during their period of service. Those unanimity effects for
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nondeliberating juries are more intriguing because they suggest that jurors imagine their
jury-room interaction in terms of its rules. Hickerson and Gastil (2008) found that most
jurors experience strong emotions both during deliberation and during the trial, and it
could be that jurors subject to majority rule experience a degree of anguish anticipating a
divided or even polarized discussion, resulting in a divided jury. That, in turn, could turn
people away from future political engagement in the same way that deliberative forums can,
for adult learners, have a negative effect on one’s sense of group efficacy (Gastil 2004). Such
an interpretation is speculative, but it would account for the striking decline in voting rates
for those empanelled on majority rule juries that do not have the chance to enter the jury
room.
These findings offer one more reason why legal reformers must consider the broader
effects of reducing the size of civil juries or lowering the bar for their decisions to majority
rule. Low-stakes juries have been proposed as a means of revitalizing the civil jury (Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System 2012). These “summary” or expedited
civil juries could make juries more appealing and reverse the trend toward ever-fewer jury
trials. But if they are not designed carefully, they could have the same features of those civil
juries that yield no positive civic impact. Future research should investigate the experiences
people have on these juries to better determine whether they can deliver on the civic
educational promise first identified by Tocqueville ([1835] 1961).
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